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ABSTRACT
Almost no research has attempted to describe and predict the dynamics of strategic decision
making among a group of interacting firms over time. This paper suggests a theoretic
approach to this problem, outlines a more specific model and summarizes an agenda for
testing the model in two specific industry settings.
We propose that strategic change — or repositioning with respect to other firms -- occurs in
the "space" defined by a set of key decisions that are unique to the industry in question.
Variables in three categories are expected to predict organization movement along these key
strategic dimensions: indicators of stress, or dissatisfaction with current strategy; indicators
of inertia, or commitment to current strategy; and measures of the attractiveness/risk of
alternative strategic positions.
The theoretic approach we develop covers individual, organization and industry-level
phenomena. The description of individual decision making highlights the shift from carrying
out normal day to day activities to contemplating some major change in that activity. We
argue that as a major decision becomes a topic of attention, previously disordered and
restricted observations will become retrospectively rationalized at the individual level and
more broadly shared with others in the organization through informal political processes and
more formal planning activities. This imposition of order makes it easier to generalize about
the timing and direction of strategic decisions at the organizational level. If the firm
ultimately repositions itself vis a vis other firms in the industry, this change in position
alters the perception of stress, inertia and opportunity in at least some other firms across
the industry and thus contributes to the ongoing dynamics of industry evolution.
The paper outlines a model of strategic dynamics based on this general description and
concludes with an agenda for subsequent research which involves: calibration and testing
with an existing data base on the pharmaceutical industry; comparing the model against
several alternative models of strategic change; developing graphic means for further exploring
interrelationships in the data; refining all three models and carrying out a second round of
testing with a second data base.
Ii
1. INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades significant progress has been made in modeling not just individual
decision making but decision making in organizations as well. While the terrain has become
better mapped, however, almost nothing has been done in this stream of literature to
simultaneously account for individual level assessments and decisions that reflect more macro
organization level processes. Even less well researched is the link between decision making
within the organization and industry level outcomes. We want to develop a model of dynamic
change in industries over time that simultaneously acknowledges the central role of individual
decision processes; the impact of organizational tasks, routines and politics; and interaction
with macro-level economic forces. Our approach draws upon literature from several
disciplines.
We view strategic change as a complex organizational response to three generalizable
influences: stress (dissatisfaction with current strategy), inertia (commitment to current
strategy), and opportunity (the attractiveness/risk of alternative strategies). Stress exceeding
inertia, in the presence of perceived opportunity, triggers the search for new strategy. The
specific components of stress and inertia and the critical strategic choices that define
alternative opportunity, are expected to vary somewhat across industries and be assessed
uniquely by each firm. This paper suggests, as an example, how each term can be
operationalized in the pharmaceutical industry.
Our aim is to be able to account for industry dynamics by drawing together three levels of
analysis. Change in the strategic position and subsequent performance of competitors
provides a primary level of explanation for strategic dynamics. We also focus on change in
macro level indicators (e.g. demographic, economic, political and technological) and changes
within the firm (especially changes in leadership, ownership and the corporate portfolio of
businesses). As conditions at one or more of these levels changes, the perception of stress,
inertia and opportunity within organizations will tend to be altered. In consequence the
probability that each firm in the industry will change strategy is altered, and the strategic
positions that are most attractive to each firm also changes.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Individual and Organizational Decision Making
While the decision-making literature is too large to be adequately summarized here,
highlighting some influential descriptions of decision making behavior, especially in
organizations, helps elucidate the antecedents of our treatment of strategy reformulation.
Rational models: "Rational" models assume that choice among decision alternatives is
directed toward maximizing some specified objective. Though frequently criticized, the
perspective is surprisingly hardy. Work compatible with the basic assumption of optimization
continues to be done, and decision aids based on decision trees and assessments of probability
show new promise with the more ubiquitous availability of computers (Huber, 1982; Thomas,
1984).
Bounded Rationality: While the notion of optimization lurks in the background of
rational/analytic models of decision making, it has been shown that decision makers are
rarely capable of optimizing. Simon's (1945) early arguments about the limits of rationality
have been particular influential. Work on biased judgement (eg. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974;
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1977) is similarly persuasive. These accounts of individual
decision making suggest that people do the best they can, but that best rarely approaches
the rational ideal. Tversky's model of choice based on elimination by aspects (1972) provides
one reasonable alternative model. More recent work focused on the impact of the problem
frame (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), and other cognitive influences on the decision making
process (Porac, Thomas and Emme, 1987), also respond to a general interest in establishing
the bounds of rationality.
Bureaucratic muddling and Rational Incrementalism: Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963)
make a compelling argument that decision making in organizations falls even farther from the
standard of rationality than suggested by models of bounded individual rationality. Allison's
bureaucratic model (1971), along with Weick's idea of loosely coupled systems (1976; 1979),
provide basically compatible accounts of the "mindless" decisions make in organizations. This
perspective emphasizes the importance of routine and standard operating procedures, notes
that action is localized; and offers little hope for system wide rationality. More recently,
Quinn (1980) attempts to rescue some of these ideas by suggesting that such incrementalism
is, in fact, very rational — given the need to discover strategic alternatives through
experimental action, the time required for building support for new initiatives throughout the
organization, and the utility of allowing different subunits of the organization to proceed at
different speeds in the necessary steps of implementing a new initiative.
Garbage Can : March and Olsen (1976) offer an alternative account of organizational
decision making. In their view, organizational actions are the result of four interacting
"streams." Participants, problems, solutions, and opportunities all affect activity in
organizations. Their connection, however, has more to do with temporal proximity than
logic, and each will predominate over the others in determining some "decisions." The "logic
of good faith" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) may help explain how organizations work at all in
such an indeterminate environment.
Information Processing: Taking another tack, a good deal of effort has gone into
models based on information processing as the basis for understanding decision making.
Bettman (1979) provides a well worked out information processing model of consumer choice
decisions. The importance of information has also attracted attention in accounts of
organization behavior (Tushman, 1977; Roberts and O'Reilly, 1979). The key factors here
include the availability, sequencing and saliency of information.
Politics: Allison (1971) and MacMillan (1978) are among those who have suggested that
political interaction offers a viable account of organization decision making. Their
descriptions emphasize the over- riding influence of self interest in organization decision
processes, a criterion that is moderated by the necessity of sacrificing immediate interest to
build alliances with others. Though politics is often described as inimicable with analytic
ideals (Pfeffer, 1981), the tone of many writers in this area is essentially rational, with the
objectives maximized those of the individual or individual unit, rather than some more
abstract greater good of the organization as a whole.
Avoidance: Janis and Mann (1977), two psychologists, suggest that decisions might be
motivated more by minimizing risk than maximizing gain, and develop a model they
characterize as conflict avoidance. This account again has a quasi rational tone, with the
maximized value the preservation of the status quo. Janis's (1972) description of group think
is a compelling account of conflict avoidance in organizational settings. Steinbruner (1974),
building on the work of Cyert and March (1963) among others, offers an alternative model
that focuses on the tendency of organizations to avoid uncertainty.
While this brief review is far from complete, it does suggest the breadth and diversity of
current approaches to decision processes both at the individual and the organization level.
We have five overarching observations on this literature:
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)
relatively few models pay attention to the influence of the task itself on decision
making behavior. Yet, in our view, the applicability of various theories of individual
and organizational decision making is strongly influenced by the subject of decision,
the previous history of individuals and the organization with the issues and the
participants involved.
2) the most useful work from an organizational perspective is able to predict outcomes :
that is, it shows the link between theory and behavior (for example Bettman's model
of consumer choice, Allison's description of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and
Steinbruner's account of nuclear arms sharing.) But it is interesting to note, despite
familiarity with work of political scientists like Allison and Steinbruner, that few of
the decision making models in the area of business management address themselves to
outcomes, and none that we know of go beyond the boundary of the organization to
consider industry outcomes.
3) while a steady stream of research and decision aids have come from the rational
perspective, many researchers became increasingly interested in the less rational
aspects of decision making following Simon's work on satisficing. The far end of
this pendulum swing is perhaps marked by March and Olsen's garbage can model.
Recently, however, March himself has become interested in the more orderly aspects
of organizational decision making (March and March, 1978; March, 1980). Avoidance,
information processing and cognitive perspectives also mark a swing back toward
accounting for more systematic aspects of individual and organizational decision
making. Additional work is needed that both recognizes the limited and parochial
nature of organization decision making, and attempts to account for generalizable
regularities in organization decision processes.
4) not enough has been said about what triggers decision making in organizations.
Political models suggest that self interest, power and influence will direct attention.
The garbage can perspective suggests that new decisions result from the temporal
proximity of problems, solutions, people and decision opportunities. Uncertainty,
conflict avoidance and the availability of information may also play a role. But none
of these accounts seem to offer a sufficient explanation for why some issues are
engaged while others are not.
5) though there has been increasing attention paid to the distinction between individual
decision tasks and decision making in organizations, the link between the individual,
the organization, and interorganizational dynamics is not well understood. The best
work has been done by political scientists like Allison and Steinbruner. Within
management, work by Bower (1970) and Pettigrew (1973) move in the direction of
linking individual actions and organization outcomes. More needs to be done,
especially to capture the dynamics of interaction over time.
The theoretical arguments we develop later in the paper respond to these five observations
and we will return to them in our concluding remarks.
2.2 Strategic Decision Making
While a good deal of the literature on individual and organizational decision making can be
viewed in a generic way, there is a considerable body of more specific literature on strategic
decision making. This work has tended to focus either on individual and organizational
processes, informed primarily by psychology and sociology, or on the content of strategy
alternatives, informed primarily by economics, industrial economics and finance (for a recent
review see Fahey and Christensen, 1986; Huff and Reger, 1987). On the process side there
exists a plethora of case studies augmented by observation across organizations that, in
aggregate, establish the idiosyncratic nature of organizations and the large variance in their
strategic decision making processes. Work on strategy content has emphasized economic and
structural constraints on specific strategies such as acquisition, merger, and diversification.
In our opinion, too little has been done to integrate process and content approaches to
strategy. And, the small number of integrative works that do exist tend to focus on specific
decision situations. Burgleman's quite interesting research on innovation within large firms
(1983; 1985) provides one example of this more focused agenda.
Although many studies explore different aspects of a firm's strategy, there is no clear
consensus on the meaning of the term—a problem which becomes acute in empirical work
requiring operational definitions. In this study, we stress two aspects of strategy both in
theory and in subsequent empirical analysis:
First, strategy is 'a pattern in a stream of decisions' (Mintzberg (1978: 934). This
viewpoint emphasizes the longitudinal character of strategy development.
Second, it is important to specify the organizational level of strategy. Hofer and
Schendel (1978) note that at the enterprise level , strategy is concerned with the
question of 'how we can maintain the political legitimacy of the organization?' (1978:
15). At the corporate level , the question is 'what set of businesses should we be
in?' (1978: 27). At the business level , the question is 'how to compete in a
particular industry or product/market segment' (1978: 27). And at the functional
level , the question is 'how to achieve the maximization of resource productivity?'
(1978: 29).
For each level of strategy four components of strategic decisions can be identified (Hofer
and Schendel (1978: 25)):
a) Scope—the extent of the organization's present and planned interactions with its
environment.
b) Resource Deplovment--the level and pattern of the organization's past and present
resource and skill deployments.
c) Competitive Advantage— the unique positions an organization develops vis-a-vis its
competitors.
d) Synergy— the joint effects that are sought from the organization's resource
deployments and/or scope decisions.
Our current model building effort focuses on business level strategy examined longitudinally.
Following Cool and Schendel (1987) and Porter (1985) we argue that scope and resource
deployment decisions reflect major strategic decisions, whereas competitive advantage and
synergy represent the result of scope and resource deployment decisions taken by the firm.
We further suggest that strategic decisions made by a group of interacting firms can be
described in terms of relative position within an n-dimensional "strategic space" defined by
key scope (vertical integration, geographic location, etc.) and resource deployment
(advertising expenditure, capital investment, etc.) dimensions that are somewhat unique to any
given industry. This idea is expanded in the theoretic section and treated more specifically
in Appendix 2.
3. PRELIMINARY THEORY OF STRATEGIC CHANGE
Overall, our goal is to develop a theory that can both explain and predict changes in
strategy over time. No one that we know of has attempted to deal with dynamics in an
inclusive way. Without a dynamic theory each episode of strategic decision making must be
treated as an independent event. Yet over time organizations reformulate strategy from an
existing set of commitments and constraints in response to past and predicted future
performance. Interest in these ongoing dynamics provides the rationale for our research.
Before we can talk about dynamics, however, we must develop a theory that explains
observed change in strategy, in a comparative statics sense, as the outcome of an internal
decisioning process. At the level of the firm, the theory is designed to provide insight into
the internal workings of the organization through the analysis of three interacting meta- level
concepts: organization stress, cumulative inertia, and strategic opportunity. Through an
understanding of the way in which these three concepts come together to influence strategy
reformulation, we hope to provide concrete answers to the following questions:
i. which firms are most likely to change strategic position;
ii. when is a change in strategy most likely to occur; and
iii. how is the firm likely to reposition itself vis a vis its competitors, given a
change in strategy?
The basic idea behind our description of strategic decision making is that organization
members are simultaneously thinking and acting in ways that bind them to existing strategy
(creating inertia) and thinking and acting in ways that reveal inadequacies in that strategy
(creating stress). However, these thoughts and actions are rarely framed in the broad terms
of strategy assessment; instead they are part of the flow of day to day work in the
organization. Our theoretic description emphasizes the individual's move from event-based
interpretation to more rational analysis and the formal and informal processes which unite
individual interpretation into more synthesized perspectives. We then suggest the role of
opportunity in determining the probability that a change in strategy actually occurs.
In response to our belief that models of organizational decision making should attempt to
trace the impacts of decisions on more macro level systems, a second research objective is to
answer these questions:
vi. how can the impact of any given relocation be traced to subsequent
relocation decisions by other firms in the industry;
v. which "strategic groups" of firms within the industry are likely to grow, and
which are likely to decline as a result of organization reposition;
vi. what is the likely location of new group formation?
In the next sections of the paper we theoretically describe strategic decision making as a
process sensitive to interpretations of stress and inertia and suggest the way individual
8perceptions become more widely shared within the organization. We then consider the way in
which the relocation of one organization affects the identification of strategic opportunity
and the probability of moving in other organizations.
3.1 Organization stress
The grounds for changing strategy are always present. No strategy optimizes all interests of
the organization or satisfies all individuals who participate in the organization. Any given
strategy will meet some goals, and provide some benefits, more successfully than others.
Implementation will sometimes fall short of expectations.
As the environment changes, and the circumstances of the organization change, the fit
between organization and environment, and between organization and individual, is likely to
deteriorate further (Christensen, Andrews, Bower and Porter, 1985). As competitors achieve
some results that the focal organization does not, the problems of fit are highlighted. As
new opportunities develop that no competitors fully address; as new technologies and new
ideas become available that were not available when the current strategy was formulated; the
inadequacies of current strategy are underscored.
Limitations of strategy and strategy implementation, eroding fit, foregone opportunities, and
individual dissatisfactions, are dimensions of stress. While many dissatisfactions can be
quickly addressed --by small changes in operations, personnel reassignment, product
improvements and the like — not all problems can be resolved within one strategic frame.
Thus, we believe that organization stress, summed across the members of the organization,
will tend to accumulate. This cumulative stress is almost inevitable; the result both of a
changing world and the logical limitations of any given strategy.
3.2 Cumulative inertia
While the forces of stress in general increase, there are also many arguments for
maintaining current strategy. This "inertia" surrounding current strategy is a measure of
commitment. We suggest that, as with stress, inertia will tend to increase with increasing
time since the last strategic change. As time passes, individuals find ways to accommodate
their interests with the demands of the new strategy (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). More
efficient operation follows increasing experience. Capital expenditures are made in equipment
and buildings that are uniquely suited to current strategy. R&D know-how and good-will
assets with suppliers, buyers and others accumulate. Policies and procedures are developed to
solidify these gains.
Not only would it be time consuming to abandon these activities and discover new
procedures; it would resubject the organization to the inefficiencies and uncertainties of new
innovation (Dierickx and Cool, 1987; Cooper and Schendel, 1976). In short, the institutional,
individual and economic adjustments that accumulate over time become less and less easy to
change and more and more risky to change -- consistent with avoidance models of decision
making (Steinbruner, 1974; Janis and Mann, 1977). These commitments tend to take on a life
of their own, independent of the coming and going of specific people. Current managers thus
have compelling reasons to work within what they have inherited rather than attempt to
recreate it. 1
3.3 The move from individual to organizational perspectives
As strategy reformulation becomes an active topic of consideration, past experience --
initially interpreted by individuals and groups within frameworks that emphasized the
complexities of immediate issues — is likely to be retrospectively organized and simplified
into the two polars we identify as stress and inertia. The transformation is due to the
rational forms of argument that are so intrinsically a part of western culture. Without
arguing that organization members are rational decision makers, we nevertheless believe that
this heritage strongly affects both the way in which members of the organization reassesses
current strategy and the content of the alternatives they consider. The reason for
theoretically identifying strategy-related stress and inertia, even during periods in which the
attention of the organization is not organized along these lines, is that these two meta-
concepts ultimately provide both the stage and script for strategy reformulation.
The basic tradeoff involved has been discussed in many guises in many different literatures
as cost/benefit, loss/gain, pleasure/pain, and approach/avoidance. This general form of
analysis has frequently cited shortcomings, chief among which are its simplifying assumptions.
There is also ample evidence that decision makers in organizations do not in fact follow the
full precepts of the more rational models based on cost/benefit and similar forms of analysis
(March and Olsen, 1976; Schwenk, 1984; Nutt, 1984; Lyles and Thomas, 1988). Nevertheless,
we believe that it is almost impossible to escape the general organization of such models, and
that strategic decisions in particular are likely to evoke more "rational" forms of decision
making.
It is our argument that even to idly speculate about changing current strategy initiates a
process of retrospective rationality in which the rich but confined interpretation of past
experience is ordered into a general "balance sheet." And once the possibility of new
strategy is seriously considered, it is very likely that at least one comparison will be sought
— if it did not indeed help trigger thoughts of changing strategy. The need for a
comparative foil is again due to the basic logic of comparing alternatives intrinsic to the
rational model with which we are all so familiar. The comparison involved invites further
plus/minus assessments.
Organization politics, the competition among individuals and units with different self
interests, broadens interpretations of both stress and inertia (Huff, 1988). Political
persuasion also requires organization and simplification which is quite likely to follow the
general pro/con format of rational assessment, whatever the more emotional impetus for
1
It is possible to think of each element of stress as having its negation in inertia and
vice versa. However, we argue that the components of each tend to be unique. As an
example at the individual level, consider the decision to sell one's current home and buy a
new one. The stress associated with the current dwelling is likely to involve one set of
factors (not enough space, poor neighborhood schools, busy street), while inertia revolves
around a different set of factors (friends next door, attractive yard with mature trees, quality
woodwork, recently renovated kitchen). Not only are the elements themselves likely to be
unique, we argue that the sources of stress tend to be interpretations of events (expecting a
child, a bad traffic accident), while elements of inertia are more likely to be the result of
activity over time (making friends, remodeling the kitchen).
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joining the debate. In the attempt to create and broaden alliances, individuals and groups
move away from the rhetoric of self interest toward the rhetoric of rational assessment. The
form of the rational model also helps maintain a useful image of logical inquiry for external
publics.
The necessities of implementation (Quinn, 1980) also tend to meld individual interpretations
into a more rational, and more broadly shared, interpretation of events and alternatives
which becomes the basis for organizational action. The managerial task of ensuring
coordinated action requires wide-spread, persuasive communication. Familiar formulae, with
their simplifications, make it possible to communicate with others (Bower, 1970). Just as
with external publics, the desirability of an internal appearance of rationality also leads to
the use of the rational form of argument.
In short, we are inclined by early training to think in terms of trade-offs, self interest and
the structure of managerial work — each of which requires communication with others —
reinforces this tendency. Simplification and rationalization is thus both the facilitator of,
and the product of, thinking and talking about changing strategy.
3.4 Opportunity and the definition of "strategic groups"
However high the dissatisfaction with current strategy, or however low the commitment to
that strategy, strategic change requires evidence of an attractive alternative. We suggest
that opportunity must be considered both as a perceptual and an economic phenomenon. In
perceptual terms the "rational" forms of thinking and acting just described not only suggest
the weighing of pros and cons with respect to current strategy, they also demand that one
or more alternatives be compared with current strategy. These alternatives provide a more
or less attractive set of opportunities for strategic change.
Organization politics provides one important internal source of such alternatives (Huff, 198?
and 1988). Individuals who have been less pleased with the current strategy — people who
might be thought of as members of the minority party in a political sense — are likely to
have been more attuned to stress arising from old strategy, less influenced by the forces of
inertia, and thus already have begun thinking about desirable alternative strategies. Once a
debate about changing strategy is opened, they are likely to come forward with quite detailed
suggestions for replacing the current strategy. As the discussion of alternatives begins it is
also likely that additional ideas will be generated by more moderate forces within the
organization. These individuals make relatively modest alterations in the current strategy to
meet the most strongly felt problems identified by those arguing for more radical
reformulation, and thus add to the pool of strategy alternatives.
Previous experience is a second important basis for recognizing opportunity. Organizations
frequently refurbish successful past actions to fit new circumstances. International expansion
in the face of declining growth in home markets, for example, often involves replicating past
strategies in new locations. If increased R&D efforts, bringing in outside consultants, or
changing leadership helped the firm through previous crises, they are likely to be tried again.
But, there is a relatively small pool of such experience upon which to draw because strategic
change is a major, relatively infrequently taken step. To expand the set of alternatives
considered we suggest that individuals and groups frequently look to similar organizations in
the same industry (Huff, 1982). These organizations have been following somewhat similar
strategies, they face a similar environment, and some results of their activities can already
be observed. In fact, the existence of more successful alternative strategies among similar
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organizations often generates stress within the organization and helps trigger the search for
new alternatives. Though organizations may search (or draw less formally on knowledge of)
other industries, we suggest that the commonalities among similar firms in the same industry
and the accessibility of information about these firms, make them the most likely source of
borrowed experience.
This intermediate level of analysis has only recently been defined as the level of strategic
groups. The first strategic group study, by Hunt (1972), categorized strategies within the
home appliance industry, suggesting that a small number of quite different strategies could
none the less lead to profitability. Subsequent strategic group studies have tended to focus
primarily on the mechanics of clustering firms, and on the relationship of group membership
to profitability. (For a review of this literature see Cool, 1985; McGee and Thomas, 1986;
Fiegenbaum, 1987; and Venkatraman and Thomas 1988.)
But the concept of strategic groups can provide much more than this. Porter (1980) suggests
that the concept of strategic groups broadly recasts the basic questions of strategy. If firm
strategies tend to cluster, in many different kinds of industries, into a smaller number of
"recipes" (Spender, 1980) that characterize major strategic options in the industry, the key
questions for the strategist become first, with which group should the firm align itself, and
second, which firms are most likely to jeopardize the firm once it establishes that position. 2
3.5 The probability of changing strategy
Although the existence of strategic groups with different levels of performance may sharpen
perception of alternatives, the consideration of new strategy is costly. As Cyert and March
(1967) pointed out some time ago even considering change involves external risk and internal
disruption. A theory of dynamics must give explicit attention to when this cost will be
incurred. We suggest that the probability that the dominant elite of an organization will
initiate a search for new strategy is positive only as cumulative stress begins to exceed
cumulative inertia, and is proportional to the difference between stress and inertia when the
"stress gap" is positive (Huff and Clark, 1978a; Smith, Clark, Huff and Shapiro, 1979).
When inertia exceeds stress the probability of initiating search is effectively zero.
Organization leaders may think about committing resources to a search for alternatives, and
may be receptive to "no cost" information concerning alternatives, but no move to commit
resources will be made until some stressful event or series of events causes stress to exceed
inertia, thus causing the probability of search to become positive.
Changes in government regulation, economic conditions, and competitor actions are among the
events that might be interpreted by organization members in ways that dramatically change
stress. The decision to consider new strategy may be "triggered" by any such stress inducing
event; however the probability of considering reformulation depends not upon the incidence
of a particular triggering event but upon the level of cumulative stress and cumulative inertia
experienced prior to the triggering event.
2 Many firms participate in more than one industry. For the moment we are focusing
on strategic decisions made at the strategic business unit level — that is, decisions made by
units within one industry.
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The probability of a change in strategy is also dependent upon the existence of attractive
alternatives. The performance of other firms in an industry provide particularly important
evidence of the potential rewards of alternative ways of doing things. In addition, the
record of other firms' ability to change strategy provides an important clue about barriers to
mobility. Thus, the probability of a change in strategy goes up to the extent that firms with
higher performance exist within the industry and where strategic change illustrates the
possibility of moving along some important strategic direction.
3.6 The dynamics of strategy changes among a group of firms
In our view the description of industry evolution, or dynamic change in strategy over time,
should take into account changes at three levels of analysis.
1) At the macro level, demographic shifts, economic changes, government actions and
technological innovation are among the factors creating environmental turbulence.
2) Within the industry, changes in the set of participating firms, their strategies and
their relative performance upset the status quo.
3) Within the firm, changes in ownership, leadership and the portfolio of businesses,
along with changes in performance, are also forces that underlie industry evolution.
Change at one of more of these levels has two important effects. Change tends to redefine
the strengths and weaknesses of individual firms, and it tends to redefine the threats and
opportunities facing each firm. In short, change at one or more level creates "cracks in the
pavement" of the status quo that makes firm relocation much more likely.
More specifically, change in the macro environment, the industry and the firm is likely to
change perception of stress, inertia and opportunity. Though change is often described as
stress producing and frequently has this effect — revealing, for example, the need for new
R&D investments, or increased advertising expenditure to ward off a new competitor --
change can also increase inertia by making current investments more valuable, by showing
unexpected pitfalls in the strategic direction of others, and so on.
3.7 Summary
The basic elements of strategic decision making we have identified grow out of previous
literature on decision making. First, we are in accord with those who have pointed out that
much of the time organizations operate more efficiently by routine than by new analysis
(Cyert and March, 1963). We are also in accord with avoidance models (Janis and Mann,
1977), though we augment the notion of inertia as awareness of risk or uncertainty (Hannan
and Freeman, 1984) with the idea that the status quo has positive attractions.
Such observations must be balanced, however, against an assertion from the strategic
management literature that the fit of the organization with its environment (and with its
internal constituency) tends to erode over time. Thus the organization, especially if it is in
a competitive environment, is likely to become less and less comfortable with past routine
and standard operating procedures. In the process, increasing stress tends to counterbalance
increasing inertia.
Once new strategy begins to be considered, however informally, we suggest that the form of
the rational model, with its emphasis on comparative evaluation, will influence the decision
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making process. Work on organization politics (MacMillan, 1978), as well as work on strategy
implementation (Quinn, 1980), suggests that comparative evaluation is likely to be elaborated
quite fully in organizations, especially when the issue is something as important as strategy
redirection. This idea provides an important bridge between models of individual and
organizational decision making. Then, we suggest that the bridge between firm decision and
industry outcome is the ripple effect created by one firm changing strategy. Strategic
change, and the performance subsequently associated with a new position in "strategic space,"
become the basis for recalculating stress, inertia and opportunity in other firms.
The basic elements of strategic decision making as we conceive it can be summarized in the
following way:
a) Individuals are likely to experience over time both increasing commitment to current
strategy and increasing stress from its inevitable inadequacies. They are more and
more likely to consider changing strategy as the stress they encounter in day to day
tasks equals or exceeds the inertia surrounding those tasks. At the organization
level, as cumulative stress across the organization exceeds cumulative inertia it is
more and more probable that the dominant elite will make the consideration of
alternatives official.
b) The process of deciding to consider alternatives to current strategy, and then
"evaluating" (however informally) one or more alternatives, is made easier by the
increasingly broad reach of retrospective rationality in which past experience is both
simplified and organized along stress and inertia lines. This rationality has its
superficial and political aspects, but we argue that it genuinely aids analysis. Even
more important, the rational form of comparative analysis is essential to
communicating the argument for change to a broad constituency.
c) Since one organization's experience is of necessity limited, the activities of at least
a few other organizations tend to be closely monitored. Similar organizations, which
the literature on strategic management defines as the "strategic group," are an
especially likely source of comparison. Once comparisons are made in terms of other
organizations it is also likely that the content of any chosen alternative will reflect
the choices of other organizations.
d) The dynamics of this process can be captured by attending not only to industry level
events, but also to events in the macro environment and within the microcosm of
individual firms. Change at any level is likely to change the level of cumulative
stress and cumulative inertia and redefine the attraction of alternative strategies.
4. DESIGN FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This account of strategic decision making has proven quite robust in our initial attempt to
translate it into a more specific model of strategic decision making that can be empirically
tested. At present, we have a preliminary model and are compiling a rather extensive data
base on firms in the pharmaceutical industry to initially evaluate it. In the future we plan
to:
- further specify the base model and three alternative models,
- calibrate all four models using the augmented pharmaceutical data set;
- rework the models in response to this comparative testing; and
- retest the models on a second data set.
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The current model, possible alternatives, data requirements, and estimation issues are
summarized below.
4.1 A dynamic model of strategic mobility
The model we are developing can best be described as a model of firm mobility. While the
theory behind the model comes from strategic management, and its precursors in decision
theory and industrial economics, the model also draws upon a quite well developed literature
that has attempted to explain a similar phenomenon in the field of residential mobility. The
residential mobility literature addresses the question of how individuals reposition themselves
in geographic space. (For a recent review see Clark, 1986). Our aim is to draw upon these
related models, particularly a model developed by Huff and Clark (1978a,b), to help
understand how firms move in strategic space.
4.1.1 An overview of the model: The model suggests that a number of variables affect
the probability of firms changing location in "strategic space." The probability of strategic
change is increased by the stress associated with:
- exogenous turbulence,
- poor performance,
- slack resources,
- internal changes.
At the same time, the probability of change is decreased by forces of inertia, which we
propose to measure in terms of:
- asset specificity,
- the firm's characteristic response pattern to strategic issues,
- time since last change in strategy, and
- previous stability of strategic groups within the industry.
Finally,
- attractive, inadequately defended opportunities must be specified to account for the
available opportunities for strategic change.
(A complete list of variables used in the model can be found in Appendix 1.)
4.1.2 Stress related variables : A first set of variables reveal inadequacies of current
strategy. At a macro level, exogenous turbulence makes it more likely that firms will change
position. There are also a set of firm-related variables that not only provide insight into
when such change will occur, but help predict which firms are likely to change strategy.
a) external events Exogenous events change the mix of threats and opportunities
facing an industry, and the degree of fit between current firm strategies and
environmental conditions. Changes in technology; in relative prices; in consumer
tastes, law, taxes, or regulation; new discoveries, inventions, the entrance of new
competitors, or the exit of major competitors are among the factors that might
induce firms to modify strategy (Rumelt, 1981; McGee and Thomas, 1986). Such
external "shocks" are not under the total control of any single firm, even the
largest. The impact of such events may be felt in many industries, but the level
I
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of the "shock" must be calculated on an industry by industry basis. Practically,
the level of stress introduced by exogenous events, S^t), might be estimated by
developing a protocol to define an external event and then measuring the space
allocated to such events over a somewhat extended preceding time period, t,
(perhaps three years) in one or more industry publications. Alternatively, it is
possible to create indices of key exogenous influences on a particular industry and
measure change in each index over a similarly extended time period.
b) noor performance While firms may not expect to achieve the benefits of industry
leaders in very different circumstances, we do expect them to compare themselves
to similar firms in assessing their performance. Thus we suggest that returns
that are not comparable over preceding time periods, at least to the average
return within the strategic group, will create stress and make a change in
strategy more likely. An appropriate measure of relative performance, S2A(t), will
depend upon the industry, and will probably have to be risk-adjusted.
c) slack resources While poor performance may motivate change, excess resources
from above average performance (or cash available from other businesses or a
parent company) are also expected to motivate a move. Slack, S3A(t), might be
estimated in terms of retained earnings as a percent of net sales, liquidity as a
percent of net sales, or long term debt as a percent of net worth, depending
upon the industry (Duhaime and Davis, 1986).
d) internal change Another variable expected to be associated with mobility is
change within the firm, S^t). Three types of change might be noted especially
— new leadership, a change of ownership or a major acquisition or divestment.
Exogenous turbulence, poor performance, untapped resources and internal changes in the firm
might all be thought of as elements of stress, SA(t). They are all circumstances that may
change the relative strengths and weaknesses of an organization. Perhaps even more
important, they tend to "unfreeze" perceptions about strategic alternatives within the firm.
4.1.3 The interactive impact of stress on the probability of moving: While different
contributions to the probability of moving tend to be considered separately in different
literatures, stress inducing variables are likely to
have combined and interactive effects upon the
probability of changing strategic position. Though we Hjpoth#»ix#<l r«Utioiuliip b«tw*«n
expect that the probability of relocation will exhibit ,tro" aad tt# pro^»tmt7 °* coring
"spikes" of rapid change in response to specific
events (Mintzberg, 1978; Miller and Friesen, 1984), in
aggregate we believe the impact of stress on the r«w
probability of moving will tend to increase over time
as shown in Figure 1.
This figure suggests that stress producing events *»w
initially will have relatively little impact on the
probability of changing position, but that as stressful Figure 1
events accumulate, their impact will be multiplicative — new events will exacerbate the impact
of other stressful events. To capture this expectation more formally, we define PA(t), the
probability of moving at time t, such that
"
-S
A(0
Pa(0 - t [SA(t)l .
C
1 + e *
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We will be working directly with the logistical form of the model in the empirical phase of
the research. However, for convenience and clarity of presentation, the model will be recast
in logit form, such that
s s (t)
PA(t) / [1 " Pa«)1 = • A-
The term on the left of this equation can be thought of as the odds of a given firm, A,
relocating during t. The log of the odds of moving then becomes
In [PA(t) / [1 - PA(t)] = s SA(t),
or, more briefly, the log of the odds can be expressed as QA(t), and
Qa(0 = s SA(t).
The logit form of the model changes the multiplicative relationships of the basic model into
additive ones. These results can also be expressed in a notation which gathers together the
stress related variables just identified, so that,
SA(t) = Sl S1A(t) + s2 S2A(t) + s3 S3A(t) + s4 S^Ct).
An interesting aspect of description of the impact of stress on of strategic decision making, is
that it puts the notion of a "triggering event" in context. The impact of triggering events
has been noted in the problem solving literature (eg. Lyles and Mitroff, 1980), but the nature
of these events has not been explored. Figure 1 suggests that triggering events are similar in
kind to an ongoing stream of events, each of which altered the sense of the organization's
situation. The event that has been called the triggering event is temporally closest to
changed strategy. That position does have power, because the content of new strategies
arises in part from unresolved stress in the old strategy. However, the event that has been
calling "triggering" accounts for only part of the stress leading to new strategy. It does not
have unique attributes other than its position in a sequence of events.
4.1.4 Variables related to inertia: In an imperfect world, all firms experience stress. As
time elapses since the adoption of a given strategy, the gap between environment and
organization is expected to increase, increasing stress. It is surprising, then, how stable
organizational strategies tend to be, even as stress rises to relatively high levels. The
implication is that correspondingly high levels of institutional and economic "inertia" surround
the firm. We suggest that several factors are especially important in creating this resistance
to changing strategy within the firm itself.
a) asset specificity To carry out any given strategy, most firms must make capital
investments that are tied to that strategy. Not all of these investments can be
recovered if the firm changes strategies. Thus, as capital commitments specific to
a given strategy, I la , increase, the probability of changing strategy is expected to
decrease.
b) size The larger the firm, the more difficult to change strategy. Larger firms will
tend to have more complex structures that will be more difficult to change. In
addition, larger firms will tend to have more stakeholders, and it will be more
difficult to achieve consensus about change among this larger group. We suggest
that size, I2a , a second variable associated with inertia, should be measured
relative to the industry average.
f
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c) characteristic resistance to changing strategy Third, it may be useful to
distinguish firms on the basis of their characteristic response to strategy
opportunities. Using Miles and Snow's (1978) typology, for example, firms
characterized as "defenders" should have high inertia since their narrowly focused
product line and work force weigh against changing position. The value of this
variable, ISa, might be assigned a priori for each firm in the industry by a panel
of industry experts.
d) duration of current strategy A fourth variable that should be associated with
inertia is the length of time since firm A last changed its position, I4a . The
process of strategy formulation itself generates a certain amount of commitment to
a new strategy within a firm. Further commitment tends to accumulate as the
firm follows that strategy (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Some benefits of the
strategy are expected to have accrued, or the strategy would have already been
abandoned. Various stakeholders will have found ways to accommodate their
interests to the current activates of the firm. Good-will assets tend to
accumulate. Not all of these benefits can be continued if the firm changes
strategy. We therefore include time as one of the variables making it less likely
that the firm will change positions.
e) group stability While the preceding variables are associated with the firm, a fifth
variable operating at the group level may also predict inertia. When the group i
to which firm A belongs does not change membership, one or more of several
conditions might be expected to pertain. Few entrants may indicate the presence
of barriers to entry; few exits may indicate the presence of barriers to exit
(McGee and Thomas, 1986). Stability may also indicate synergies (with related
businesses, for example) that make the location more attractive than direct
profitability would indicate. At any rate, our prediction is that group stability,
I6a , will be associated with inertia, and we suggest that stability should be defined
as the sum of entrants plus exits, divided by the total number of firms in A's
strategic group i.
Overall, we believe that these five variables also have an interactive, multiplicative
relationship. Thus the combined effect of inertia, Ia(0» on the probability of firm
A moving, PA(t), all other things being equal, is as shown in Figure 2.
Cnmulatjy Inertla't Effect on P,(t)
lint* dnc* !••! change In tireWgr
Figure 2
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The logit form of the expanded model is additive, such that
Qa(t) = s Sa(t) - i x I la(t) - i 2 I2a - i3 I3a - i 4 I4a(t) - i5 I5a(t)
QA(t) = s SA(t) - J IA(t).
or
4.1.5 Opportunities for strategic change: The propensity to seriously consider a change
in strategy that will result in a shift in strategic group membership can be thought of as a
tradeoff between the pressure to move arising from organizational stress and the resistance to
change associated with inertia. However, members of a firm may be unhappy with their
current strategic position but may still not change position, because other positions are
thought to be either undesirable or unattainable. The stress-inertia formulation of the model
must thus be augmented by an opportunities component if we are to move from a model of
intentions to a model capable of explaining and predicting actual changes in strategic group
membership. We shall assume that the probability that firm "A" leaves its current strategic
group i during time t is a function of the relative attractiveness of strategic opportunities
outside group i, A(t) such that the odds of moving is proportional to A(t). This new
component can be added to the stress-inertia model, such that
Qa(0 - SA(t) - IA(t) + In A(t). 3
In order to more specifically describe strategic opportunities it is necessary to locate a given
opportunity, *, within the multi-dimensional strategic space defined by key strategic variables,
and then specify A*(t), the relative attractiveness of that opportunity * to firm A. For all
firms in a given strategic group i, the set of opportunities, L
i5
can be described by their
locations, (X
x
* ,x2* ,x3« ,...), which we assume to be in a k-dimensional lattice excluding
points within the domain of the firm's current strategic group i, and bounded by an envelope
describing the outer limits of the strategic space relevant to the firms in the industry. The
operational details pertaining to the delineation of this choice set can be found in Appendix 2
of this proposal.
The relative attractiveness of any member * of the choice set Lj is assumed to be a function
of RA*(t), the expected returns or benefits accruing to firm A if it moved to a new strategic
position *. However the attractiveness of * is assumed to be dampened by barriers to
mobility, BA*; and by the perceived risk associated with a shift in strategic position to *,
GA«. In keeping with the decision to describe the strategic change process with a nested
logit model, we shall assume that the relative attractiveness of opportunities at position * is
an exponential function of these three variables such that
( rRA*(t) - bBA* - gGA* )
A*(t)= e
3 The log transform of opportunities arises as a consequence of assuming that the
probability of selecting any specific strategic location is independent of the decision to
select any other alternative, coupled with the choice of a nested logit form of the model
used to characterize the two-stage decision process: first, the decision to move, and
second, the subsequent choice of strategic position from the set of possible opportunities.
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Expected returns, barriers to mobility and perceived risk are all discussed in greater detail in
Appendix 3. Given that we use them as a measure of the relative attractiveness of each
position in the firm's strategic choice set, L
x
,
we can assign a value to A(t), such that
A( t) = £. A*(t).
With the introduction of the relative attractiveness of strategic opportunities outside of the
domain of the firm's current strategic group, we have specified all of the necessary
components of the first level of our strategic change model. The model identifies a critical
set of variables that we believe will enable us to predict in aggregate when the current
configuration of strategic groups will change, and, at the micro level which firms are most
likely to change position. The conceptual power of the model stems from the observation that
the probability of changing strategic position may differ significantly from one firm to the
next depending upon differences in organizational stress, differences in inertia surrounding
each firm's current strategy, and differences in the relative attractiveness of opportunities
facing each firm. The theoretical power of the model also stems from links that can be
drawn between these variables and previous research.
4.1.6 The choice between strategic alternatives: Given that a firm changes its strategic
position, we now address the problem of predicting the nature of that change both at the firm
level and in terms of the implied change in the size and composition of strategic groups
within the industry. Much of the theoretical apparatus necessary for the construction of this
second part of the model is already in place. A change in strategy is interpreted as a move
from one location to another within the k-dimensional strategic space described by the key
dimensions of strategic choice within the industry. (See Appendix 2) The key to predicting
where a firm, A, will relocate within that strategic space is the relative attractiveness of
opportunities, A«(t), at different locations, *.
At the firm level, the general form of this second stage of the model is the familiar Luce
type choice model in which we assume that the probability of firm A choosing strategic
alternative * during time period t, PA*(t), is independent of the probability of choosing any
other strategic position. We also assume that the probability of selecting alternative * is
proportional to the relative attractiveness of the perceived opportunities at that position. The
result is
Pa««) - A*(t) / A(t)
where A(t) is as defined previously — the relative attractiveness of opportunities at all
locations on the restricted lattice Lj (assuming that firm a is currently a member of strategic
group i).
The theoretical as well as the practical value of the above observations can be significantly
increased if we explicitly:
— establish the set of possible strategic locations from which the firm might
choose.
-- define the relevant strategic variables influencing the choice of a new
strategic position within that space.
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a) defining the domain of strategic search: The
technical issues of defining the domain of strategic
search are dealt with in Appendix 2. Our basic
notion is that the appropriate domain of search is
not the full logical range of each dimension of
strategic choice, but a smaller set of alternatives
defined by the current strategies of members of the
industry. The result of this definition of strategic
space is an enveloped lattice of possible locations, as
illustrated in Figure 3.
Strategic* Looations, L
• location* w/i
current group
* locoliont eultiga
a currant group
Figure 3
b) specifying the relative attractiveness of strategic opportunities: Envision the firm, A,
engaged in a significant change in strategy — one by definition that will involve relocation
beyond the boundaries of the firm's present strategic group i. As stated earlier, the
conditional probability of moving to position *, Px*(t), is proportional to the relative
attractiveness of the opportunity at *, A*(t), which is in turn an exponential function of
three strategic variables: the expected returns accruing to a shift to the new strategic
position *; barriers to mobility; and the perceived risk of moving to *. In Appendix 3, we
provide operational definitions for these three variables.
This definition rounds out the second stage of our model of strategic mobility. In aggregate,
the model allows us to predict not only which firms will move when , but where they will move
— meeting our first set of objectives. The second stage of the model also allows us to meet
the second set of objectives, predicting which groups of firms will grow and which decline, as
well as predicting the location of new groups.
4.2 Competing models of strategic change
The discussion thus far has focused upon a single model of strategic change which is primarily
descriptive. In order to better gauge the relative performance of our primary model, we
propose to develop and evaluate three competing models of the strategic change process.
These competitors come directly from other views of the organization decision processes. We
have not fully developed these competing alternatives at this time; however, we can indicate
their general form in the hope that others may be interested in similar efforts.
Two of the models we envision developing will formalize a view of strategic change in which
the firm is assumed to have a very limited capacity to evaluate alternatives that deviate
significantly from the current strategy (Fiegenbaum, 1987). The result is a model of limited
rationality. We will make a further distinction between a simple learning model in which the
direction of change is dictated by a comparison between present and past performance related
to present and past strategic positioning, and an autoregressive model in which the direction
of change along any dimension is based on the trend of past decisions. In both cases, we are
essentially assuming that the firm changes its current strategy in small incremental steps or
adjustments without any overt effort to evaluate its strategic position vis a vis other firms in
the industry. Both alternatives are designed to represent a very different conceptualization of
strategic change than that which underlies the basic model, but a view that is very much in
keeping with the emphasis on limited rationality in recent decision making research. March
and Levitt ( ) suggest richer forms of adaptive learning models which could also be adopted
to the current context.
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As a third alternative, we propose to develop a model of strategic change which tracks
patterns of firm movement across strategic dimensions over time. This model assumes that the
industry can be characterized by a relatively small number of strategic groups that maintain
their respective identities over time (although individual firms may change behavior and the
monitoring of group membership over time may indeed be valuable for future modeling
activity) by adopting "recipes" (Spender, 1980) which are a mix of earlier routines or rules
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) and adaptations of existing rules. Such behavior may be consistent
with an avoidance model. Under these conditions, we may be able to model firm mobility as a
finite Markov or semi-Markov process (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Huff, Thomas, and
Fiegenbaum, 1983). The state space in our analysis will be the set of strategic groups, and
strategic change will be defined as the movement from one strategic group to another.
We do not intend for these additional models to become "straw men" in the analysis. In fact,
it is our hope that at least one or two of these alternatives will perform well enough to
provide a quite different account of strategic dynamics. The underlying philosophy is that
more that one perspective on a problem is necessary to capture the essence of the
phenomenon in question. In the long run we hope to work toward developing alternative
models to provide this richer view of strategic change, and anticipate that similar efforts will
be made by an increasing number of strategy researchers.
4.3 Data collection and data management
4.3.1 The pharmaceutical data base : Empirically testing the full set of models on strategic
dynamics will be done with an existing data base on firms in the pharmaceutical industry
developed by Howard Thomas. The data cover thirty two U.S. and European companies in
terms which allow us to build upon prior longitudinal analysis (Cool, 1985). Appendix 4
outlines the firms currently included. The data collected cover a twenty four year time
period, and thirty-five variables — some of which, such as those on product scope and the
timing of new product releases, have been collected from the industry press and annual
reports. We have also carefully expanded data available from the Federal Drug Administration
on new drug approvals and new chemical entities.
The key strategic dimensions which define competitive strategy and strategic space in the
industry were carefully identified from a thorough literature survey (e.g. Helms, 1975; U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1986; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Annual Reports;
Cool, 1985; Cool and Schendel, 1987) and discussion with academics and pharmaceutical
company executives. Appendix 4 defines key strategic dimensions in this industry.
Following the definition of strategic space offered above, we have constructed measures of
scope and resource commitments together with associated performance measures. Scope
commitments in the industry are specified in terms of product scope, diversification,
geographical scope and size measured by sales. Measures of resource deployment reflect the
bases for establishing competitive advantage and synergy in this industry, with particular
emphasis upon R&D, capital investment and marketing programs adopted by industry
participants. Multiple measures of performance — including financial, market share, and sales
growth measures -- have also been identified.
The data base is structured to track strategic assets, such as technological expertise, market
share and brand loyalty. For example, we can develop measures reflecting the accumulation of
R&D and capital expenditures in the pharmaceutical industry (number of patents, new chemical
entities and new drug approvals) as a summary statement of technological expertise. Such
"stocks" (Dierickx and Cool, 1987), relative to competitors, determine the firm's competitive
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position and hence potential profitability. They also contribute to the cumulative structural
inertia of the organization.
Stress in this industry tends to reflect the depreciation of these stocks over time. Given the
long lead times required to bring a new drug to market, a focus on gaps in the level of R&D
versus the competition, and new product introductions versus the competition, is expected to
more accurately reflect stress than reliance on direct performance measures alone. It is this
stress that is expected to lead to changes in the strategy variables identified in Appendix 4.
Though this is a promising beginning, we would like to expand the number of companies
represented in this data base to approximately fifty companies, which would more broadly
reflect the global character of the industry. We also would like to expand the time period to
30 years (1955-1985).
The work summarized in Appendix 4 suggests that the variables in the model can be given
sensible operational definition in a specific industry context. With the completion of the
pharmaceutical data base, we therefore will begin testing the model; however we must deal
with several measurement and classification issues before the model can be calibrated. These
issues are discussed in Appendix 5.
4.3.2 Development of a second data base : To avoid the idiosyncracies of any single
population, we believe that it is necessary to estimate and test the four models we will be
developing on a second data base. The most important criterion for this second data base is
that it have somewhat different strategic characteristics than the pharmaceutical industry. In
addition, however, we would like this second industry to reflect the important trends toward
globalization occurring in many major industries.
An industry which we believe meets these criteria is the home appliance industry. After
decades of anticipation, the industry is showing evidence of globalization. More important,
the strategic dimensions of choice in this industry concern manufacturing and operational
efficiency, rather than the innovation and R&D concerns which dominate the pharmaceutical
industry. The link between operational strategy (flexible manufacturing etc.) and performance
(Skinner, 1968) is of real interest. Howard Thomas has already done some preliminary work in
the European segment of this industry with Charles Baden- Fuller at the London Business
School. We propose to significantly expand the data currently available and to incorporate
American and Asian competitors.
As with the pharmaceutical industry, there has been interesting and potentially useful prior
empirical analysis. Indeed the first strategic group study, by Hunt (1972), drew upon data
from the appliance industry. Our goal is to match the pharmaceutical industry data base in
terms of the thirty year time period covered, though we will probably collect data on a
somewhat smaller set of competitors. There are many calls for longitudinal study in the field
of strategic management, but very few carried out, even fewer with a strong theoretical base.
Longitudinal studies are time consuming and expensive to conduct. These hurdles tend to
result in limited sample studies. The comparison of two different industries would
significantly improve our insight into those aspects of the models that are invariant across
industries and those features that are particularity sensitive to the peculiarities of the
industry in question.
I
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4.4 Graphic analysis and representation of strategic dynamics
The models proposed in this research are designed to provide insight into forces impinging
upon the firm that ultimately result in observed changes in strategy. We believe that such
modeling efforts are essential to subsequent theoretical development in the field of strategic
management, and are anxious to find better ways of examining the complex interrelationships
involved. We also recognize that abstract modeling approaches to the study of strategic
management may have minimal impact upon academics who are interested in looking at
strategic change from other perspectives, and may have even less impact on the larger
audience of practicing professionals.
In response to a strongly felt need both to expand our insight into strategic analysis and to
communicate the nature of strategic change processes to those less interested in formal
modeling, we propose to develop graphic means of portraying strategic mobility. The outcome,
as we presently envision it, would be a series of computer graphics routines capable of
providing:
a) a three dimensional visual picture of the observed relationship between strategy,
organizational stress and organizational inertia;
b) dynamic representations of observed changes in these three summary variables
over time for a given set of firms within an industry; and
c) graphic simulations of competitor repositioning under different scenarios
describing changes in the competitive environment.
Figure 4 suggests how a three dimensional graphic might summarize the context of strategic
decision making for three archetypical firms. Firm A might be thought of as the well
entrenched "cash cow" dominating the market and requiring relatively little asset deployment.
Firm B, with smaller market share and less satisfactory performance, has less inertia and more
stress associated with its current strategy. Firm C, though its performance is even poorer, is
somewhat more closely tied to its current strategy, perhaps through capital investment.
Note that the use of area and the addition of color in Figure 4 actually allows the
representation of five pieces of summary information: _ _ . _, . mIndustry Structure at T ,
stress (distance a, for firm B) oKotmSt
inertia (distance b, for firm B)
resource deployment, an
important aspect of strategic
response (distance c, for firm B)
market share (the area of the
circle), and
performance (indicated by the
color of each circle)
Fl.ro
STRESS
INERTIA
Figure 4
These single time period descriptions are relatively uninformative, however. What is needed is
a graphic depiction of the decision context over time. Figure 5 summarizes Firm A's changing
position over four time periods. Our idea is to use quarterly data to put together animated
sequences of such data tracing strategic dynamics over time. We are also interested in the
possibility of developing trend surface representations which would depict the industry as an
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evolving "island" similar to the three dimensional
topographical maps used to represent changing
geographic environments.
The possibilities of visual representation are
enormous. It is possible, for example, to use
graphics to explore interrelationships just among the
variables contributing to stress, or to visually
search for shifts in the relationships of specific
variables to performance.
Strategic? Dynamlcg
INERTIA
Figure 5
While the same kind of analysis can be carried out mathematically, we believe that visual
interpretation will prove to be a much faster and potentially more sophisticated means of
identifying patterns in the data. As our understanding of industry dynamics grows, we also
expect these representations to be an efficient means of communicating the results of the
study to a broader audience. We are also interested in linking graphic representations to
"what if analysis" for heuristic and predictive purposes.
5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY FOR THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND
PRACTICING MANAGERS
The field of strategic management has been characterized by relatively restricted work based
on very disparate research perspectives. In addition, much of the work has been static in
nature, seeking to provide "snapshots" of strategic postures through the weaponry of
multivariate analysis. In contrast, we believe that the research we propose would make a
genuine contribution to the field by developing theoretic models consistent with individual,
organizational, and industry level explanations of strategic decision making. Strategy as a
field needs grounded theory development and our efforts contribute to that need.
Our theoretic perspective acknowledges the limited rationality of individual and organizational
decision making, but we believe that, particularly for the consequential task of strategic
decision making, the form of rational assessment continues to have considerable influence.
The result of post hoc rationalization, which we believe can be summarized in terms of
stress, inertia and opportunity, should allow predictions about the outcomes of strategic
decision making to be linked with outcomes of cognitive strategic models (see Porac et. al.,
1988; Reger, 1988).
At the broadest level we see this work as an important step toward theory building using the
strategic group as a primary unit of analysis. The significance of our theoretical work will
be judged in terms of our success in explaining and predicting strategic responses to an
evolving industry context created largely by related firms seeking to sustain competitive
advantage over time.
Because the project we propose is grounded in the actual experiences of firms within two
industries, the results also are more likely to be of direct interest to decision makers.
More specifically, the project should provide practitioners with
i
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a) a better sense of the interrelationship between their own history and strategic
decisions;
b) a sense of industry evolution which emphasizes a comprehensive view of competitor
behavior; and
c) a tool for thinking about future strategic moves and the sustainability of competitive
advantage.
The last possibility is of particular interest to us. With the advent of interactive
spreadsheet programs, practitioners are becoming conversant with the potential returns from
software that can answer "what if?" kinds of questions. Our strategic change model,
coupled with the proposed graphics development, provides an opportunity to run simulations
of firm and industry responses to changes internal and external to the firm or industry. We
feel that the visual representation of the outcomes of these "what iP simulations has the
potential to provide valuable new insights into strategic change and industry dynamics. In
particular, it allows firms to track the behavior of "outlier" firms under evolving competitive
scenarios. In general we expect that the central tendency of firms within an industry will
be less useful for understanding and anticipating subsequent change within the industry than
information on the prior experience of one or two outliers that demonstrate the viability of
new strategic alternatives.
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Appendix 1: Summary of Terms
Stage 1: Predicting Which Firms will Change Strategic Position
PA(t) - The probability that firm A relocates (moves outside of its current
strategic group i) during time t
S
x
(t) - Magnitude of change in the external environment over a specified set of
preceding time periods, t
S2(t) - Performance of the firm relative in average performance within the
strategic group
S3(t) - Slack resources over t
S4(t) - Internal change in leadership, ownership and/or major acquisition or
divestment during t
SA(t) - Cumulative stress (based on measures of external events, poor
performance, slack resources and internal change)
IjCt) - Capital investment
I2(t)
- Firm Size
13(0 - Characteristic resistance to changing strategy
I4(t)
- Duration of current strategy
I5(t)
- Stability of firm A's current strategic group
Ia(0 " Cumulative inertia (based on measures of capital commitment, firm size,
characteristic resistance to change, duration of current strategy and
strategic group stability)
Qa(*) " The log of the odds of firm A relocating during t
Stage 2: Predicting Where a Moving Firm will Relocate
Lj - The set of opportunities available to firms within strategic group i.
Members of the set are described by their locations in a k-dimensional
lattice that is bounded by an envelope describing the outer limits of the
strategic space relevant to firms within the industry, and which excludes
locations within the boundaries of strategic group i (see Appendix 2)
Oa*0) ~ The relative attractiveness of any given location, * , within L t to firm A
at time t
A(t) - The sum of the relative attractiveness of all possible locations outside of
A's current strategic group i
ra*0) " The expected performance benefits accruing to firm A if it moves to a
new strategic position *
BA* - Barriers to mobility associated with
*
GA* - Risk associated with a shift in strategic position to *
RA(t) - A's performance in its current location at time t
Rj(t) - Average performance of firms within group i
Rj(t) - Average performance of firms within group j
R*(t) - Estimated performance of a location outside of any current strategic
group but within Lj
^a*(0 - The distance between A's location and * along each of the k dimensions
in strategic space
bk
+
- parameter estimating "impedance" or barriers to mobility in a "positive"
direction along dimension k
bk
"
- parameter estimating "impedance" or barriers to mobility in a "negative"
direction along dimension k
C - The set of locations outside existing strategic groups
Hj - The set of locations within the domain of a strategic group
Appendix 2: Defining the Domain of Strategic Search
The domain of strategic search consists of the set of possible strategic positions currently
occupied by firms within a given industry, as well as the set of strategic alternatives that
firms within the industry might adopt in the future. A firm's strategic position is defined in
terms of the firm's current strategy along each of the key dimensions of strategy defining the
industry. These choices serve to locate or position the firm in the k-dimensional strategic
space of the industry.
Strategic space can be defined if:
1. The key dimensions of competition can
be identified,
2. A set of firms can be specified, and
3. The firms can be clustered along the
strategic dimensions identified.
The results are often displayed graphically, as in
Figure 1, though a larger set of strategic dimensions
is usually necessary to categorize key choices in the
industry.
The identification of the strategic choice set
ultimately comes down to an attempt to formalize the
observation that strategic positions too far from the
current position of other firms in the industry should
not be included within the choice set because
perceptually, industries are defined by their
participants. If a firm were to move to such a
"remote" location, it would be considered to have
moved outside the industry; furthermore, the activities
of the firms in the industry tend to enact the
industry environment thereby increasing the likelihood
that remote positions will be non-viable positions.
The concept of a bounded strategic space is
sufficiently central to our argument that some
indication of how we might operationalize the concept
is in order. We begin by constructing a k-dimensional
convex hull as defined by the current locations of the
firms in the k-dimensional strategic space. An example
of such a hull is shown in Figure 2.
We assume that all positions within the convex hull
are potentially viable strategic alternatives. The next
step is to define a "strategic envelope", H
,
surrounding the hull and at a "distance" beta 1 from
the hull, as shown in Figure 3. All positions within
the strategic envelope are assumed to be potential
elements in the strategic choice set.
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The same methods can be used to define that portion of the search domain already occupied
and in some sense controlled by a particular
strategic group i. The positions of the members of the group serve as the basis for defining
the convex hull and the corresponding strategic envelope Hj is assumed to be a distance beta
2 beyond the convex hull. See Figure 4.
Following the argument presented in the previous
section, it is assumed that the set of strategic
possibilities - the choice set-available to a firm
leaving strategic group i is the
restricted lattice L
t
consisting of all lattice points
inside. H but outside Hj. As will
become clear in the subsequent discussion, we may
wish to make a further distinction between those
elements of the choice set Lj contained within the
strategic envelope, Hj, of another strategic group j ;
and those positions.C, inside H but outside any existing
strategic group, as shown in Figure 5.
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Appendix 3: Defining Opportunity
In keeping with our earlier discussion, we propose that the expected returns from a move to
position *, RA*(t), be measured in terms of the difference in the expected performance at *,
R*(t), and RA(t), tne firm's current performance level. If the new position * is within a
strategic group j then the expected performance at * is assumed to be equal to the average
performance of firms in group j such that
RA*(t) = Rj(t) - Ri(t) .
If the location * is outside any strategic group (but within the strategic envelope for the
industry) then we assume that R*(t) is estimated from a statistical model (e.g. OLS or possibly
data envelopment methods) employing data on strategic dimensions and performance data from
existing strategic groups to calibrate the model such that
R*(t) = h (X^,...,Xk*)
where Xk * is the value describing *'s location on dimension k and the function h is the
statistical model.
The attractiveness of a profitable position * is tempered by BA *, the difficulty of moving
between A's location and *. BA * is defined as a function of the distance between A's
location and * along each of the k dimensions in strategic space, DA *k , and the magnitude of
the barriers to mobility along each of the dimensions, bk . We will treat the difficulty of
moving along each of the k dimensions, BA+k , as a separate component of the total difficulty
or cost of changing strategic position from A's current position to the new position * such
that
BA-£b;»A*k
K
The difficulty of moving between A's current position and * along dimension k is assumed to
be proportional to the distance involved, where the constant of proportionality is the
magnitude of the barriers to mobility along dimension k. However we recognize that it is
often easier to move in one direction than in the other along many strategic dimensions;
therefore we define the impedance to mobility in the positive direction along dimension k as
bk
+ and in the negative direction as bk " and we maintain the direction as well as the
magnitude of the separation between A's position on dimension k and *'s position on k such
that
DA*k - ( *kA " *k . ) and
BA'k= bk
+DA*k if DA*k >
. bk"DA,k if DA ,k < 0.
With this formulation we are trying to emphasize the multidimensional nature of barriers to
mobility as well as the importance of distinguishing between the size of the barriers to
mobility along a given dimension and the distance (and direction) that a particular firm would
be required to move along that dimension in order to reach strategic position *.
Finally we must account for risk as a factor in any firm's assessment of the relative
attractiveness of an alternative strategic position *. We begin by recognizing that locations
outside existing strategic groups (members of set C) tend to pose more risk (greater variance
around expected profitability, for example) than locations within the domain of a currently
viable strategic group, Hj . We also recognize that certain firms - "prospectors" in Miles and
Snow's (1978) typology -- exhibit a greater than average tendency to be risk takers, as
evidenced by their tendency to innovate. The perceived risk of relocating to position * and
the associated reduction in the attractiveness of * is assumed to be
gGA * = gxGi* + g 2Gi*G2A
where G 1 = 1 if * is a member of C (all locations outside of existing strategic groups)
if * is a member of Hj for some strategic group j and
G2 = 1 if firm A is not designated as a prospector firm
if A is designated as a prospector.
With the completion of the operational definitions of the variables influencing the firm's
assessment of strategic position *
,
we can now specify Paj(0 the conditional probability of
firm A shifting from strategic group i to strategic group j (or to a strategic position in C
outside the domain of any existing strategic group):
PAj(t)=£PA*(t)
where pA*(t) °a*0) / °a(0 and
QA*(t) = e (rRA*( f) " bkDA*k " 8lG l* " g2G l*G2A)
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Appendix 4; Pharmaceutical Data Base
U.S.
Abbot Labs
American Cyanamid
American Home Products
American Hospital Supply/Baxter Healthcare
C. R. Bard
Becton Dickerson & Co.
Bristol Myers
ICN Pharmaceuticals
Johnson and Johnson
Eli Lilly
Norwich-Eaton
Marion Labs
Merck & Co.
Merrell-Dow
Pfizer
Richardson-Vicks
A. H. Robbins
Schering-Plough
G. D. Searle
SmithKline Beckman
Sterling Drug
Sybron Corp.
Syntex Corp.
Upjohn
Warner-Lambert
Wm. Rorer
Non-U.S.
Beecham - UK
Boots - UK
ICI - UK
Burroughs Wellcome - UK
Ciba-Geigy - Swiss
Hoffman LaRoche - Swiss
Sandoz - Swiss
Hoechst - FRG
Appendix 4; Data Base Variables (Preliminary)
Scope Commitments
Variable
New Products 1
New Products
Class l l
New Products
Class 2 1
Product Scope 1
Product Scope
Class l 2
Product Scope
Class 22
Product Mix
Patents
Diversification
Geographic
Scope
Size
Explanation
Number of new products introduced.
Number of new products introduced in
each of 23 product classes based on
therapeutic substitutability.
Number of new products introduced in
each of 6 product classes based on
research relatedness.
Number of products in each of 23
product classes.
Number of products in each of 23
product classes based on therapeutic
substitutability.
Number of products in each of 6
product classes based on research
relatedness.
% of generic/ethical drug sales.
Number of patents granted to the firm.
Herfindhal Index of diversification
across therapeutic and product classes
% non-U.S. sales over total. Sales
broken down when possible annually.
Ln. of total domestic drug
sales. Reflects overall strategic
ability to influence drug market.
Resource Deployment Variables
Variable
Capital
Expenditures
R and D
Expenditures
R and D Capital
Stock
Advertising
Expenditures
Explanation
Actual and % sales as a measure of
investment intensity.
Actual and % sales as a measure of
R&D intensity.8
(Cumulative number of NDA's submitted/
Cumulative number of IND's submitted)
Actual and % sales as a measure of
intensity in promotion and detailing.4
Data Sourc
FDA and
FDA and
FDA and I
FDA and i
FDA,IMS, D
US Patent )f
FDA.PDAN
Annual R its
S&P,Cor iu
Duff&Pllp
Annual R>t:
IMS
Data Sour
:
Compusta
Annual (
Compusta
Annual ep
FDA
Compusta
Annual ep
Product Strategy
Performance Variables
Variable
(Cumulative number of NCE's approved/
Cumulative number of all products
introduced.)
FDA,IMS,PDF
Explanations
FDA
IMS
PDR
1
Data Source
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
IMS, PMA
IMS, PMA
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
Return on Sales
Sales Growth
Industry Market Share
Weighted Market Share
United States Food and Drug Administration
IMS America Classification
Physician's Desk Reference
These variables can be produced for any time period between January 1, 1962 and
March 23, 1985 for any specific dates therein. All of these variables can be
subdivided for differing dosage forms and delivery systems.
These variables can be produced for any date between January 1, 1962 through
March 23, 1985, inclusive. All of these variables can be subdivided for differing
dosage forms and delivery systems.
This ratio will also be calculated as the ratio of firm R&D to overall health care
sales (to allow for differences between single business and diversified firms).
Access to industry data bases will enable these expenditures to be broken down into
categories of promotion to professionals (detailing), and promotion to consumers. In
addition, the proportion of sales which are wholesaled to hospitals/drug stores can
also be obtained.
Appendix 5: Calibration and Testing
From the outset our theoretical perspective on strategic dynamics has developed with the
specific intention of creating an operational model that could be evaluated against actual
behavior at the firm level. As a consequence, the transition from theoretical model to
statistical model is immediate. We are dealing with a nested logistic model of the sort
described by McFadden (1975) whose statistical properties are well-known (see Press, 1972).
The model in question involves two decisions taken in sequence. First, the decision to change
strategy, or remain in the current strategic position. Second, the decision to switch to some
specific new strategic position, j, given that the firm decides to change strategy.
The general form of the model is
Pij Qij ' Pi»
Pi = (l +e"
x
'i
/V
Qij = e
8
'ij* /£e Eikr
where
p^ is the probability that firm i selects strategic alternative j (during a given
time interval t, (the time interval t will be implicit in the remainder of the
discussion unless otherwise indicated);
Pi is the probability that firm i changes strategy (during t);
qjj is the conditional probability that firm i selects strategic position j given that
a move occurs;
Xj and Zj: are lxn and lxm vectors of observations (for firm i) on the
independent variables specified in the previous section; and
(2 and ^fare lxn and lxm vectors of parameters.
The model is estimated in two stages using maximum likelihood methods in which the vector
of parameters /2 is identified that maximizes the likelihood function Llt as specified below,
followed by the estimation of ^*such that L 2 (shown below) is maximized for the sample of
firm behavior. For the conditional polytomous choice problem (the selection of a strategic
position j from the set of possible choices^), the likelihood function is
L,
-ttlT qy
n
\
' j
!
l
I
1 , if strategic position j is chosen
where yy =
'
, otherwise.
y<
Given Lls it can be shown that the maximum likelihood estimator of is V where
satisfies the following condition:
(Press, 1972).
£ £ ( e *ij r / j? e HkT ) zy = £ £ zjj yu
' J ice* I J
The second stage of the calibration is concerned with the estimation of the vector /^ that
maximizes the likelihood function L2 where
Lj-TTpi'iO-pi) 1-*!,
Cl , if firm i changes position
and yi = 7
[O, otherwise.
a.
The likelihood function is maximized if the vector JB satisfies the following condition:
£ Pi x i = in v\
•
' a
where * » (1 + e ""4 r )"\
Although the maximum likelihood methods are well-defined in theory, we anticipate rather
substantial computational problems in the actual estimation phase of the project. The number
of variables involved is large, as is the potential choice set for the polytomous choice
problem. At this stage we can only indicate that we are aware of these potential difficulties;
however some of these difficulties have arisen in the past because of limitations in computing
capacity and these limitations are rapidly disappearing.
Likelihood-ratio tests will be used to evaluate the overall performance of the model both in
terms of its ability to describe observed changes in strategic position given that a change
occurs and its ability to predict the occurrence of a change in strategy. Similar tests will be
used to evaluate the significance of specific independent variables where the null hypothesis is
that the associated parameter is zero.
Estimation issues to be resolved : In the long run we will have two longitudinal data sets on
firm behavior, and we will be able to observe the evolution of strategic groups and the
repositioning of firms within these two populations over a thirty year time period. In point
of fact, however, we as yet have very little "feel" for the longer term dynamics implied by
our model. We suspect, for example, that we will observe episodes of rapid activity within
the industry followed by periods of relative stability (few changes in strategy); however we
don't know whether our model can or will generate such episodes. We also recognize that the
estimation problems as defined above fail to address any autocorrelation problems that might
arise if we use longitudinal data to estimate and evaluate the model. Again, our only
rejoinder at this point is that we propose to work on these problems during the course of the
project.
As indicated in the paper, we also propose to develop three competing models of the strategic
change process. We can say very little about the estimation problems associated with these
models at this point since they have not yet been fully developed. However our preliminary
work on this problem suggests that the resulting models will be representative of three classes
of models each having known statistical properties (finite Markov or semi-Markov, Bayesian
updating, and autoregressive.) One important feature common to all three models is that the
computational requirements will be a small fraction of those required in the estimation of our
original model of strategic dynamics primarily because the number of variables involved and
the number of choices facing a given firm will be quite small for each of the three alternative
models in comparison with our current model.
Given that we have successfully calibrated our main model and the three competing models,
the final phase of model evaluation will focus on a comparison between four models in terms
of their respective abilities to predict the timing and the direction of strategic change at the
firm level and the resulting time path (over as much as thirty years) of strategic change; and
changes in the strategic positioning of firms in the aggregate as measured by changes over
time in the size, composition, and positioning of strategic groups within the industry.


